[1] Christopher Morris. Center for Strategic and International Studies. On-screen statement. Kate O'Sullivan (writer/producer). "The i Bomb" Horizon. London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1995.

[2] For further discussion on the Caucasus, see: Ahmed Rashid. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale University Press, 2001). Lt. Col (ret). Lester W. Grau. "Hydrocarbons and a New Strategic Region: The Caspian Sea and Central Asia." Military Review. vol LXXXI, no. 3 (May-June 2001). Michael T. Klare. "The New Geography of Conflict." Foreign Affairs. May-June 2001. 49. Michael T. Klare. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. London: Metropolitan Books, 2001.

[3] Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman. Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000. pp. 5-12.

[4] Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman. Ibid. pp. 102-103.

[5] Edward N. Luttwak. "From Geopolitics to Geo-economics." The National Interest (Number 20, Summer 1990). pp. 17-23. Philip Seib. Headline Diplomacy: How News Media Affects Foreign Policy. Westport, CN: Praeger, 1997. p. 129.

[6] Michael T. Klare. Ibid. p. 50.

[7] Michael. T. Klare. Ibid. p. 52.

[8] Psychological operations is defined by Colonel Jeffrey B. Jones (Commanding Officer, 4th Division PSYOP, JFK Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg) as "the use of information to affect attitudinal and behavioural change in a foreign audience." On-screen statement in "The i Bomb" (1995).

[9] Mark D. Alleyne. News Revolution: Political and Economic Decisions about Global Information. London: Macmillan, 1997. p. 50.

[10] Philip Seib. Ibid. p. 107. This rhetoric is short-hand for the co-evolution of conflicts and technology. The Gulf War is described as the first "Real-Time" or "Virtual Reality" war, the break-up of Yugoslavia as the first "Internet War", the China/US stand-off in April 2001 as a "Hacktivist War" (in deference to 'hacker-activists'), and so forth. This meets Marshall McLuhan's famous criteria, cited in Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. Boston, MA: MIT Press, 1999 [1964] that "All wars have been fought by the latest technology available in any culture" (p. 339), a truism also for the media sphere. On China, see: Lt. Col. Timothy L. Thomas (ret). "China's Electronic Strategies." Military Review. vol LXXXI, no. 3 (May-June 2001).

[11] For discussion of the "Vietnam Syndrome" effect on U.S. civilian life and para-military subcultures, see: James William Gibson. Warrior Dreams: Paramilitary Culture in post-Vietnam America. New York: Hill & Wang, 1994. For coverage of the Vietnam War as the first "Live" war, see: Will Lyman (Narrator) and Richard Ellison (Executive Producer). Vietnam: A Television History (13 volumes). Boston, MA: WGBH Boston; UK: Central Independent Television ; France : Antenne-2, 1983.

[12] Colonel Paul E. Vallely and Major. Michael A. Aquino. "From PYOP to MindWar: The Psychology of Victory." In. William Cooper. Behold a Pale Horse. Sedona, AZ: Light Technology Publications, 1991. (p. 374/p. 6). This document has been circulated as samizdat by conspiracy theorists (Lyndon Larouche, William Cooper) due to Aquino's military intelligence career and religious affiliations. Annotations cite page-numbers in Cooper's text, and then the original 12-page document (which Cooper reprinted). See further discussion in: Michael A. Aquino. PSYOP: The Ethical Dimension. Washington DC: National Defense University, 1987.

[13] Colonel Paul E. Vallely and Major. Michael A. Aquino. Ibid. (p. 370/p. 2). The full passage reads: " On the other hand, we lost the war - not because we were outfought, but because we were out-PSYOPed. Our national will to victory was attacked more effectively than we attacked that of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, and perception of this fact encouraged the enemy to hang on until the United States finally broke and ran for home." (p. 370/p. 2).

[14] Colonel Paul E. Vallely and Major. Michael A. Aquino. Ibid. (p. 370/p. 2).

[15] Colonel Paul E. Vallely and Major. Michael A. Aquino. Ibid. (p. 371/p. 3). I interpret Mindwar as the fusion of Karl von Clausewitz's military strategy, Hans Morgenthau's realpolitik school, Marshall McLuhan's communications/media studies, and Eric Hoffer's warnings about "True Believers". MindWar is a Hegelian synthesis of the policy-planning reactions to the Vietnam Syndrome (thesis) and early 1980s proliferation of cable, satellite and video technology vectors (antithesis), which re-moulded the strategic geography of international conflict and global information flows.

[16] Colonel Paul E. Vallely and Major. Michael A. Aquino. Ibid. (p. 374/p. 6). The full passage reads: "In its strategic context, MindWar must reach out to friends, enemies, and neutrals alike across the globe - neither through the primitive "battlefield" leaflets and loudspeakers of PSYOP nor through the weak, imprecise, and narrow effort of psychotronics - but through the media possessed by the United States which have the capabilities to reach virtually all people on the face of the Earth. These media, are, of course, the electronic media - television and radio. State of the art developments in satellite communication, video recording techniques, and laser and optical transmission of broadcasts make possible a penetration of the minds of the world such as would have been inconceivable just a few years ago. Like the sword Excalibur, we have but to reach out and seize this tool; and it can transform the world for us if we have but the courage and the integrity to guide civilization with it. If we do not accept Excalibur, then we relinquish our ability to inspire foreign cultures with our morality. If they then devise moralities unsatisfactory to us, we have no choice but to fight them on a more brutish level." (p. 374/p. 6).

[17] Colonel Paul E. Vallely and Major. Michael A. Aquino. Ibid. (p. 373/p. 5). The full passage reads: " If we do not attack the enemy's will until he reaches the battlefield, his nation will have strengthened it as best it can. We must attack that will before it is locked in place. We must instil in it a predisposition to inevitable defeat." (p. 373/p. 5). Compare with McLuhan. Ibid. "The war of the icons, or the encoding of the collective contenance of one's rivals." (p. 339).

[18] Vallely and Aquino make this clear distinction in several passages. " The Propaganda Ministry of Goebels must not be a part of the American way of life. Quite right, and so it must be axiomatic of MindWar that it always speaks the truth. Its power lies in its ability to focus recipients' attention on the truth of the future as well as that of the present. MindWar thus involves the stated promise of a truth that the United States has resolved to make real if it is not already so." (p. 375/p. 7). Elsewhere, they write: "Unlike PSYOP, MindWar has nothing to do with deception or even with "selected" - and therefore misleading - truth. Rather it states a whole truth that, if it does not now exist, will be forced into existence by the will of the United States." (p. 376/p. 8).

[19] Alvin Toffler. On-screen statement in "The i Bomb" (1995). Alvin Toffler. The Third Wave. New York: Morrow, 1980. Alvin and Heidi Toffler. War And Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century. London: Warner Books, 1994.

[20] Definition given in narration of "The i Bomb" (1995). This documentary also highlights traditional PSYOP techniques in the Gulf War, including testimony by Combat Production Specialists about AM/FM/Shortwave/Color TV broadcasts, and First Sergeant Ryan Walsh's plan (as PSYOP Liaison to Theatre HQ), using anthropological/ethnographic methods, to propagate leaflets in bottles. General James L. Jones (32nd Commandant of the Marine Corps) states on-screen that Allied forces dropped 29 million PSYOP leaflets during the Gulf War. General Jones claims that this tactic led to 44% of Iraqi combat units deserting, 17,000 Iraqi defections and 87,000 Iraqi surrenders.

[21] Alexander Cockburn. "CNN and PSYOPS." CounterPunch. "Censored 2001." Project Censored. Peter Philips (ed.). Censored 2001: The Year's Top 25 Censored Stories. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2001. pp. 46-48. Alexander commented on the connection between perception management and media: "Employing perception management techniques includes gaining the willing support of the major news organizations. This is a tedious process that must be developed over many years through trusting relationships. Reliance should be placed on seasoned reporters who have developed a sense of responsibility, ethics, and loyalty. Unfortunately, too many young reporters believe that institutions are inherently dishonest and the only role for the press is that of an adversary." (p. 112).

[22] Janet Morris. Center for Strategic and International Studies. On-screen statement in "The i Bomb" (1995).

[23] Col. John B. Alexander (ret). Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in Twenty-First Century Warfare. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. p. 113.

[24] Col. John B. Alexander (ret). Ibid. p. 162.

[25] Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman. Ibid. pp. 114-115.

[26] Preston Peet. "The DU Years: Death and Destruction by Heavy Metal."

[27] Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman. Ibid. p. 66.

[28] Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman. Ibid. pp. 61-64.

[29] Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman. Ibid. p. 66.