Still, federal prohibition did not mark the end of GHB panic. This fact is most lucid in the date rape drug trial of Timothy and Kenneth Iverson. The two brothers were charged with rape and aggrivated sodomy for allegedly having drugged and assaulted an 18 year old Georgia State University student. Fulton County Superior Court Judge Wendy L. Shoob presided over the case. In her own words, "While the state has described this as a brutal assault, there was actually no evidence to support that description, and I was sitting here the entire time . . . Rather, there was evidence that the victim actually consented to sexual relations and the victim herself could not recall whether or not she could give consent . . . She did not make any outcry of rape and instead had to be prompted by the police." Moreover, the student "testified that she had experimented with the drug in the past and she described her experience with the drug as similar to an alcohol high," according to Judge Shoob (qoute in Schmitt, "Date rape"; Schmitt, "Brothers").Nevertheless, it took jurors only 90 minutes to convict the two men. One of the state's witnesses, a nurse named Jean Strunk, referred to GHB as a "date-rape drug" in violation of the Judge's orders. According to Judge Shoob, "The jury's verdict may have been influenced by the injection of this illegal evidence" (quote in Schmitt, "Date rape").
In another case, the charges levied on a GHB supplier were irrationally severe. Lindley Troy Geborde is being charged with murder for providing a willing recipient with GHB at a rave and for not "telling him about the dangers," according to a report by the Associated Press. His attorney said, "Maybe his conduct was somewhat negligent, but it doesn't rise to the level of murder" (“Jury Selection”). Clearly, GHB has acquired such an evil reputation that authorities now assume malicious intent in its use, possession, and distribution.
The widespread phenomenon that I have described fits the description of moral mass hysteria taken advantage of and partially caused by symbolic politics. Philip Jenkins and Kenneth Thompson present two major theories of moral panic, both of which can apply to this case.
According to the "interest group theory," as propounded by Jenkins, moral panic arises ultimately as a result of several interest groups; there is evidence for this here, with various groups both causing and benefitting from the GHB panic. These groups include the DEA (whose press releases were crucial in adding GHB to the list of Schedule I drugs, thereby adding to their funding), NIDA (which now has an unprecedented budget of $50 million for so-called "club drugs" alone), the media (which obviously gain from morality-laden sensationalism), and lawmakers such as Senator Abraham (who failed in his bid for reelection, but who currently serves under George W. Bush). An alternate paradigm stems from the notion of social anxiety in a so-called "risk society," in which panic arises naturally out of malaise, worry, or insecurity; a case could be made for this as well, with the US witnessing an unprecedented level of sexual scandals in Washington that could have led to anxiety surrounding sexual impropriety, possibly creating public pressure for a symbolic scapegoat. Incidents of children acting violently have added to this tension, setting the stage for the reassertion of "traditional family values." One particular example of this is the school shooting in Boulder, Colorado. Perhaps not by coincidence, a campus publication from Colorado University at Boulder (quoted earlier) describes date rape drugs in an especially alarmist fashion.
In either case, an essential trait is symbolic signification attached to the root element in a moral panic. Generally speaking, one issue is related to some other, such that public opinion and therefore reaction are determined by the nature of this other issue. "A signification spiral does not exist in a vacuum. It can only work if the connecting links are easily established by drawing on pre-existing ideological complexes or discursive formations." (Thompson, p. 20).
First, anti-GHB rhetoric (whether disseminated via the government, the media, or the public) has tended to take on the discursive structure that had already existed for drugs. The government's (and therefore the media's) categorization of GHB as a designer drug, rave drug, and date rape drug all invoke negative "pre-existing discursive formations." In Dr. Zukin's testimony before the Congress, for instance, he said "abuse" not "use" in reference to GHB, even when frequent administration or addiction were not implied. This linguistic double-standard is common when referring to drugs, implicitly conveying the value judgment that any use of a "drug" is abuse.
Second, groups have consistently drawn a parallel between GHB and sexual offense, with news reports referring to GHB as a date rape drug even when the report has nothing to do with sexual assault ("Jury Selection"). This has occured in other well-studied panics; Jenkins, in describing a situation in England during the 1980s said, "the emphasis shifted to interest group politics and social issues such as censorship, feminism, gay rights, education, and public morality . . . In all of these areas, debate would be conditioned by moral panics, by stereotypes of sexual violence and threatening sexual predators" (quote in Thompson, pp. 20 – 21). This has clearly been the case here, with the belabored repetition of the "date-rape drug" epithet staining GHB's reputation to the point where harmful intention is suspected by its very presence, as evidenced by the recent behavior of the courts.
As the Hillory J. Farias and Samantha Reid Date-Rape Drug Prohibition Act of 2000 plainly demonstrates by its very title, GHB was not outlawed because of its actual effects, but because of its alleged (or even potential) role in date rape. Thus, GHB became a symbol of sexual assault, of danger to women, of danger to teenagers, of danger to family, of danger to "morality."
Further, a "panic" implies disproportionality, meaning when "the threat or danger is more substantial than is warranted by a realistic appraisal . . . indicators of disproportionality [include] exaggeration of statistics... singling out a social problem when it is no more dangerous than any other, suggesting that conditions at one point in time pose a severe threat when there are no worse than at other times" (Thompson, pp. 9–10). It should be clear from the preceding discussion that all these criteria apply to the treatment of GHB.
Furthermore, the response to GHB even follows the stages of moral panic: "First, something. . . is defined as a threat to values or interests. Second, this threat is depicted in an easily recognizable form by the media. Third, there is a rapid buildup of public concern. Fourth, there is a response from authorities . . . Fifth, the panic recedes or results in social changes" (Thompson, p. 8).