edited by Russ Kick
published by The Disinformation Company
oversized softcover * 352 pp * $24.95 * ISBN 0-9713942-0-2

Sample Chapter

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David Lochbaum

I graduated in June 1979 from the University of Tennessee with a degree in nuclear engineering. The meltdown at Three Mile Island had occurred less than three months earlier. For the next seventeen years, I worked at nuclear power plants in Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Kansas, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New York, and Connecticut. This prompted me to join the Union of Concerned Scientists, where, as their nuclear safety engineer, I monitor safety performance of all US nuclear power plants. In more than two decades, I've studied literally thousands of reports on nuclear plant accidents and near-misses. Many of these reports are publicly available, but they're very obscure and their information is veiled in technical jargon and acronyms called "nukespeak". The following stories, which examine some basically unknown and unpublicized problems since 1968, provide a glimpse behind the nuclear curtain.

Error Jordan

In 1968, operators shut down a nuclear research reactor to modify its cooling system, and a pipe connected to the water-filled pool containing the reactor core had to be cut open. There were two options: Remove the irradiated fuel assemblies from the pool so the water level could be dropped below the point where the pipe connected to its wall, or block the pipe at a point between the pool and the proposed cut. To save time, workers decided to block the pipe. To do this, they wrapped tape around a basketball until it was about two inches larger. They lowered the basketball into the pool and inserted it into the pipe's opening. They inflated the basketball to seal it firmly within the pipe, then cut into the pipe and started working.

They didn't work for long. Water pressed against the basketball until it popped out the open end of the pipe. Nearly 14,000 gallons of water drained into the basement in five minutes. A gate inside the reactor pool, which was supposed to have been removed during this work but fortunately remained in place, kept more water from draining. Had this gate been removed, the water level would have dropped below the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor core. According to the official report, two-thirds of the fuel assemblies would have been uncovered. [1]

Actually, all of the fuel assemblies would have been uncovered for the upper two-thirds of their length. Water performs two vital functions: It cools the fuel assemblies that produce substantial amounts of heat long after the reactor is shut down, and it shields workers from the intense radioactivity emitted by the fuel assemblies. Uncovering the fuel assemblies in the reactor core could have triggered a meltdown or, at the very least, produced an extremely serious radiation hazard for plant workers.

The nuclear industry has made tremendous improvements in safety since 1968. Redundancy and defense-in-depth are key elements in the nuclear industry's safety program. Two basketballs would be used today.

Indoor Pool

In early July 1981, workers at Nine Mile Point Unit 1 in central New York faced a problem. All of the radwaste system's tanks were filled, yet waste water continued to be generated. So they deliberately flooded the basement of the waste building with about four feet of water.

Nearly 150 metal drums, each containing 55 gallons of highly radioactive solid waste, were stored in the basement. The rising water caused many of these drums to float. Several drums tipped over and spilled their radioactive contents into the water.

On July 8 of the same year, workers pumped 50,000 gallons of contaminated water from a tank into Lake Ontario. They discharged this radioactive water to make room for the water from the waste building basement. Workers tried decontaminating the basement for the next three months. In October, these attempts were abandoned with about a foot of water still covering the basement floor.

The plant's owner told the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on October 31, 1981, about the 50,000 gallons of contaminated water discharged to the lake in July. The flooded basement and the spilled waste drums were not mentioned.

In 1989, the plant's owner was harshly criticized by the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)--the nuclear industry's own watchdog organization--for the still-flooded waste building basement. INPO’s secret report leaked to the media. After NRC officials watched the story on the TV news, they dispatched a special team to investigate. The NRC inspectors estimated that the radiation fields in the basement approached 500 rem per hour. A lethal radiation dose is 450 to 600 rem. Thus, an employee would have received a fatal dose by working in that basement for only an hour.

The NRC censured the plant’s owner for failing to tell them about the flooded basement. [2]

When the INPO report leaked to the public, the plant was on the NRC's "Watch List," meaning that it received heightened regulatory attention. In addition, NRC Resident Inspectors were stationed at the plant from 1981 through 1989. In eight years, including several months when the plant was on the "Watch List," no NRC inspector ever ventured into the waste building basement. What they were watching all that time? Good fortune that it included the TV news.

Life Imitates Art

In the beginning of the 1979 movie China Syndrome--starring Jane Fonda, Jack Lemmon, Michael Douglas, and James Hampton--control room operators confront an unexpected situation at the fictional nuclear plant. The extremely tense situation ends when an operator taps an instrument gauge for water level. The stuck indicator moves to its true position. The operators feel much, much better.

This scene was ridiculed within the nuclear industry as pure Hollywood fiction. Gauges never stick like that in real life, and even if they did, backup gauges would be used.

On New Year's Day 1986, operators were starting up the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station in Mississippi. An operator monitored the water level in the reactor vessel using a nearby recorder as he increased the plant's power output. Moments later, much to his surprise, the plant automatically tripped (i.e, shut down) because of low water level in the reactor vessel. The recorder pen had stuck in the normal range, providing a false sense of comfort while the actual water level gradually dropped until it reached the trip setpoint. A backup gauge showed the water level dropping, but the operator had not checked it. [3]

Maybe if operators spent less time critiquing movies and more time cross-checking instrument gauges with their backups, incidents like this Mississippi mess might become fictional. Until then, they'll remain all too real.

Jellyfish Put Nuclear Plant in a Jam

Jellyfish appear fairly harmless. Despite an occasional tale about swimmers being stung by jellyfish, Hollywood movies always feature shark attacks. No National Geographic special featured cameramen being lowered into the sea in heavy steel cages to film voracious jellyfish.