Howard Bloom's book Global Brain: The Evolution of Mass Mind From the Big Bang to the 21st Century (2000) applies paleopsychological insights and the Group Selection hypothesis (Bloom, 2000: 4-6) to cultural evolution and civilizational development. Bloom draws on several epistemological models including social construction (Bloom, 2000: 66), complex adaptive systems, and the 'global brain' hypothesis examined by Peter Russell and Joel de Rosnay (Bloom, 2000: 3). This panoramic view parallel's Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's noogenesis (Galtung and Inayatullah, 1997: 109) and James Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis (Galtung and Inayatullah, 1997: 152).

The core of this vast synthesis is a quintet of adaptive learning mechanisms (Bloom, 2000: 144) that shapes how groups and societies self-select. Conformity enforcers shape group identity and norms, 'level' individuals and coherence against external adversities (Bloom, 2000: 42). Diversity generators embody different cognitive approaches and values systems (Bloom, 2000: 43). Inner judges provide an emotional feedback loop to the environment (Bloom, 2000: 43). Resource shifters reconfigure flows in response to challenges and group needs (Bloom, 2000: 42-43). Intergroup tournaments, ranging from competitive gambits to international wars, accelerate social innovation and collective intelligence for survival (Bloom: 2000, 43).

Bloom offers many provocative examples in his synthesis of how collectives test ideas, create fundamentalisms and groupthink, and interface with natural ecosystems (Bloom, 2000: 220). The dynamic processes modelled by Civilization III have their roots in the evolving biological substrate. Cynobacterial colonies embodied the social power of the network effect (Bloom, 2000: 16). Plagues and wars tested Toynbee's creative minority (Galtung and Inayatullah, 1997: 120) and hastened urbanization (Bloom, 2000: 116). Cambrian life-forms discovered imitative learning (Bloom, 2000: 31). Primate research into the "Pumphouse Gang" found social conformity that also propagated information effectively (Bloom, 2000: 52; Wright, 2000: 289). Finally, Bloom warned of a looming battle between new viruses and human societies for survival in the global meshwork (Bloom, 2000: 215). By modelling these insights, Civilization III's programmers would create a richer gaming experience.

Since Civilization III begins with founding a city-state, Bloom's insights into cities-as-systems are relevant, echoing the distinction between cities as meshworks and networks (De Landa, 1997: 30-33). Biological time recapitulates as elite and generational shifts (Galtung and Inayatullah, 186). Transformations from nomadic bands to city-states was a resource shift from generalist to specialist, and in Catal Hayuk's example, increasing social stratification (Bloom, 2000: 107). Predatory nomads like the Mongols gave way to urban metropolises (Bloom, 2000: 117), foreshadowing Ibn Khaldun's primitive-civilization cycle (Galtung and Inayatullah, 1997: 27-28, 192). Increasing social complexity also generated more uncertainty. Creative bickering between city-states, a core aspect of Meier's game, was honed by natural selection to generate cultural diversity (Bloom, 2000: 94). City-states expanded the scope of reciprocal bonds to create cohesive regional alliances (Bloom, 2000: 110). Conquest and assimilation were not zero-sum: they were also an information swap that spliced cultures into mosaics (Bloom, 2000: 119). Bloom's study of Sparta ("a land-rooted military society . . . [that] faced resolutely inward") and Athens ("a seagoing trading empire. . . [that] faced without without") highlighted how different choices shaped collective futures (Bloom, 2000: 135). Sparta explored tribal cohesion and wealth by force (Bloom, 2000: 137) and social conformity. Athens embraced mentorship and complexity-generating subcultures (Bloom, 2000: 142). City-state culture imprinted strategies for dealing with uncertainty.

The game's isometric perspective, where "the player controls numerous units . . . within a vast playing area" (Poole, 2000: 135), shifted the player's focus to group dynamics. Here Bloom has many provocative insights. Dominant humans form leadership hierarchies based on controlling attention structures (Bloom, 2000: 168). Prestigious cultures and social mannerisms are copied by others (Bloom, 2000: 170), which Civilization III integrates by its system of cultural iconography and victory (Poole, 2000: 48). More problematic is the game's handling of group constriction and projection (Bloom, 2000: 194), resolving crises by finding external enemies and how inner judges create fear-driven fundamentalisms (Bloom, 2000: 197; Wright, 2000: 213). Meier's AI engine generates resource scarcities and revolutions (Poole, 2000: 119) but does not offer overtly authoritarian belief systems as options, except by controlling the geostrategic space and resource flows of others (Bloom, 2000: 204). While the game's ability to manipulate natural processes and time-space (Poole, 2000: 49) makes integrating Bloom's research worthwhile, the paleopsychologist would not overlook why such "videogames are already extremely good at providing an exhilarating blast of the animal emotions." (Poole, 2000: 235).

M4: Civilization-driven Game Theory (Robert Wright)

Robert Wright's book NonZero: The Logic of Human Destiny (2000) provides an intriguing starting point for Civilization III game-players: they became tribal leaders due to their social status (Wright, 2000: 26) in a "Big Man" society (Wright, 2000: 79). For "usually leaders are an expression of the forces at work in their own societies" (Schwartz, 1991: 146). By casting the players this way, Meier echoed Toynbee's perspective on 'pioneer leaders' (Fernandez-Armesto, 2000: 11).

Wright views cultural evolution through the prism of game theory (Wright, 2000: 296, 338), social complexity theory (Wright, 2000: 344-346) and positive feedback loops (Wright, 2000: 313) in which cultural evolution is intensified by non-zero-sum dynamics and information exchange. This may be the hidden link between macrohistorical pattern recognition, data-mining, and risk management techniques (Wright, 2000: 31; Galtung and Inayatullah, 1997: 173). He discerned an historical trend, despite wars and revolutions, of evolving toward "higher and higher levels of political organization." (Wright, 2000: 58) and evading the second law of themodynamics (Wright, 2000: 244). Wright's macrohistory found Spencerian analogies between societies and organisms (Wright, 2000: 102; Galtung and Inayatullah, 1997: 70-71) and memetic co-evolution as a self-feeding process (Wright, 2000: 283). He also acknowledged the influence of William McNeill's narrative history (Wright, 2000: 118).

There were many reasons for this "persistent and universal evolutionary logic" apart from Jared Diamond's model of cultural diffusion (Wright, 2000: 76, 145). The public works in Civilization III facilitated public interest by serving the public's welfare (Wright, 2000: 85). City-state wars often led to political unification (Wright, 2000: 110) and commercial trade routes (Wright, 2000: 117). The non-zero-sum evolution of city-states exemplified how "people became embedded in larger and richer webs of interdependence." (Wright, 2000: 6). This tension, exemplified by the Hanseatic League, was between "the urban, more liberal future and the rural, oppressive past." (Wright, 2000: 151). The growth of commerce then fuelled the spread of governance and national political institutions (Wright, 2000: 179). Governance shifted from centralized bureaucracies to decentralized meshworks (Wright, 2000: 247). The structural underpinnings of the Hanseatic League foreshadowed international meshworks such as the European Union and the late 1990s Asian currency crisis (Wright, 2000: 211).

Civilization III has several telling flaws from Wright's perspective. Biological and cultural evolution is too complex for "what-if" games (Wright, 2000: 293). Meier focused too much on classical civilizations like the Greeks and Romans (Wright, 2000: 131). Like several macrohistorians, Meier made made the fatal mistake, in the eyes of cultural relativists, of ranking certain societies as higher than others (Wright, 2000: 14). The game randomly generated barbarians as non-player characters, however, Wright argues persuasively that they had indigenous cultures and technology transfers (Wright, 2000: 126). Although we evolved amidst social hierarchies we were also status-seeking (Wright, 2000: 83), and so not necessarily consensus-driven sheep. In a brilliant critique of totalitarian logic, Wright noted that "direction plus purpose doesn't necessarily equal goodness." (Wright, 2000: 318).